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China 4.0 
Party and Society Debate the Digital Transformation 
David Schulze and Nadine Godehardt 
The development of China’s Internet attracted great attention among foreign observers 
in 2016. This was due to record sales in Internet trade, extensive hacker attacks on pri-
vate companies and government agencies, huge investment programmes for start-ups, 
a new controversial Internet law and the growth of government Internet censorship. 
China 4.0 stands for both control and creativity. How does that work? What is the Chi-
nese public saying about the opportunities and risks of the digital transformation? What 
goals is the government pursuing, particularly with their Big Data and Internet Plus 
strategies? And what are the consequences of a new law on Internet security which comes 
into force in June 2017? New frameworks are being defined that could shape long-term 
cooperation with China on issues surrounding digitisation. An analysis of opinions 
emanating from Party members, economists, the military and scientists sheds light on 
the positions that are currently dominating Chinese discourse on the subject. It also 
poses the question to what extent China might become a laboratory for the global 
digital future. 
 
On 16 November 2016, representatives from 
the largest international IT companies gath-
ered at the Third World Internet Conference 
held near Shanghai. Chinese President Xi 
Jinping reiterated China’s vision for the fu-
ture of the Internet in a video message shown 
at the opening ceremony of the conference 
– to focus on international cooperation, 
national sovereignty, expansion of global 
infrastructure and promoting national Inter-
net economies. These cornerstones reflect 
both domestic developments and the new 
role China will play in the global Internet. 
At the World Internet Conferences, 
which have taken place in China since 
2014, the country presents itself as a digital 
global player, open to the world. However, 
a closer look at Xi’s speeches at these con-
ferences reveals that the government is pri-
marily interested in expanding and securing 
its own national Internet and domestic 
Internet trade. As a result, China’s leader-
ship under Xi strives to achieve a political 
balancing act – between openness, inno-
vation and international cooperation, on 
the one hand, and controlling the core 
technology and ensuring national (i.e. digi-
tal) sovereignty, on the other. 
 
Introduction 
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Digitisation as a Key Policy Objective 
Efforts to digitise China effectively are a core 
component of Xi’s political strategy. Digital 
innovation and technologies are intended 
to support national economic growth in 
the long term. Digitisation gives China the 
opportunity to economically overtake 
Western industrialised nations and become 
an IT superpower. Political initiatives such 
as the Internet Plus and Big Data strategies, 
both adopted by the State Council in 2015, 
underpin the ambitions of Xi’s government 
to realise the Chinese dream – the re-emer-
gence of the country as a superpower – by 
all available means. At the same time, Inter-
net Plus and Big Data outline the frame-
work within which the government, media 
and industry must operate. 
Both strategies emphasise the benefits 
of the new information technology for 
business and the government. They could 
reduce costs, increase efficiency and boost 
productivity. On one hand, the strategies 
look at the reform and investment tasks of 
the administration and, on the other hand, 
emphasise the need for data security and 
control. Big Data focuses specifically on the 
collection, exchange and automated analysis 
of information by the government and com-
panies. The potential of IT development and 
its transformational power are being com-
pared with the Industrial Revolution. Simi-
larly, it is said that digitisation will perma-
nently change all areas of daily life and 
society. 
Furthermore, the government aims to 
reduce China’s outward military vulnera-
bility and technological dependence as well 
as strengthening its geopolitical participa-
tion. Digitisation is, therefore, a code word 
for efforts by China to secure its economic 
significance in the long term and to ensure 
that, as a global IT power, the country is 
more influential on international bodies. 
The government’s internal decision-
making and control processes in the area of 
digitisation have been centralised since the 
Central Leading Group for Internet Security 
and Informatization and the Cyberspace 
Administration of China were established 
in 2014. These structural changes, the 
numerous speeches by President Xi Jinping 
and Premier Li Keqiang and the national 
strategy papers form an initial cornerstone 
of China’s vision for the future of (global) 
Internet governance. It is mainly national 
policies, standards and processes that are 
currently being defined. In the medium 
term, however, this could mean that co-
operation with China becomes difficult, 
especially in the digital economy, because 
the rights of foreign companies in the coun-
try need to be repeatedly renegotiated. At 
the same time, however, the Chinese gov-
ernment emphasises its openness to inter-
national cooperation. It already announced 
at the first EU-China Roundtable on Digital 
Cooperation in July 2015 that it had an 
interest in European-Chinese cyberspace 
cooperation and – in line with the new 
development initiative of Xi’s government – 
in establishing a ‘Digital Silk Road’. 
The new Cyber Security Law, adopted on 
7 November 2016, shows that China’s deci-
sions have already had an impact on the 
global economy. Even the draft legislation 
has been heavily criticised in the West 
because it means the Chinese government 
is placing an even greater focus on the po-
tential risks of the Internet and the state’s 
control function. The aims of the legisla-
tion are defending national and civilian 
interests, maintaining critical infrastruc-
ture and peace in society whilst also ensur-
ing individuals are protected against cyber-
crime and data theft. Apart from conven-
tional data protection and cyber defence, 
however, its most daring reform is to 
remove anonymity from the Web. Internet 
providers must now verify the identity of 
users when offering network access or data 
services; otherwise they risk fines and clo-
sures. In addition, data collected by domes-
tic providers of ‘key digital infrastructure’ 
may only be stored in that country. This 
means that transferring such data abroad 
would require a security check and approval 
by government bodies. In particular, this 
applies to foreign companies and their data 
traffic. In this respect, China’s legislation 
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on Internet security also has global con-
sequences, while, at the same time, it gives 
an indication of Chinese priorities should 
global digitisation become regulated. 
Opportunities for Business 
and Society 
China is currently in a stage of rapid digiti-
sation – economically, socially and politi-
cally. Despite strong regional variations in 
broadband availability, in 2014, it entered 
the ranks of countries with Internet cover-
age of more than 50 percent of the popu-
lation. 
In the coastal regions and major cities, 
Internet coverage is already at the same 
level as Western industrialised countries. In 
2015, investments in China’s IT communi-
cations rose by 34.5 percent, faster than in 
any other sector. Indirectly affected indus-
try branches also grew, the express delivery 
services industry, for instance, increased 
by around 48 percent. There were a total of 
20.7 billion deliveries, 15 billion more than 
four years ago. In addition, a majority of 
the world’s Internet users live in China and 
their number continues to grow steadily. 
Nearly all Chinese netizens use mobile In-
ternet (92.5 percent); one quarter use only 
their smartphones to access the Web (24.5 
percent). 
The general population has welcomed 
the new technologies enthusiastically. Com-
munication, purchases and payments are 
increasingly taking place via the mobile 
Internet. WeChat, originally a smartphone 
application for instant messaging (similar 
to WhatsApp), has become a universal 
social platform since 2011. The app, pro-
duced by Internet giant Tencent, is used by 
schools, businesses, the government and 
private individuals alike. Innovative features 
that support and enhance cultural tradi-
tions increase users’ identification with the 
application. This applies, for example, to 
electronically sending Hong Bao, originally 
envelopes containing gifts of money pre-
sented to friends and relatives on special 
occasions.  
More than 97 percent of all Internet 
users in China use WeChat. At Chinese New 
Year 2016, around 420 million people sent 
gifts of money using the application. Fast 
and easy communication as well as inte-
grated functions for account management, 
investments and speculation, for shopping, 
orders, navigation etc. also make the appli-
cation useful for migrant workers, micro-
entrepreneurs and people in remote areas. 
Users can keep in touch, coordinate and 
communicate in larger groups and over 
long distances all using one application; it 
is easier and more efficient than a combi-
nation of email, text messaging and other 
apps. WeChat is already used to register on 
public Wi-Fi networks and increasingly also 
for access to public institutions, such as 
making hospital appointments. In 2014, 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) used the 
application to send messages from the Party 
to Chinese peacekeepers serving abroad. 
WeChat is a symbol of China 4.0. Firstly, 
it is a great app for which more and more 
features were developed in a very short time. 
Communication in China takes place almost 
exclusively via this app. Secondly, many 
Chinese netizens no longer leave the app 
when engaging in other activities on the 
Internet. The Internet is becoming a kind of 
(WeChat) intranet. The app is an example 
of what direction future developments in 
the mobile Internet market might take. 
However, the Internet economy not only 
offers opportunities for major, well-estab-
lished IT companies, it is also particularly 
attractive for the increasing number of uni-
versity graduates in the country. As China’s 
economic growth slows, many, encouraged 
by the government, are launching start-up 
companies in areas such as entertainment, 
technology or finance. Last year, the vol-
ume of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) for 
start-up investments tripled to 1.5 trillion 
renminbi (206 billion euros). This figure 
is five times greater than all other venture 
capital funds in the world combined. The 
780 government funds, most of them at 
the provincial and city level, monitor the 
nationwide start-up industry and evaluate 
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Table 1 
China: Growth through Digitisation 
 Internet sector as a 
share of GDPa and 
global rank 
IT comm. / software 
(investments in 
tangible assets 
[billions of EUR]) 
New enter- 
prises registered 
per annum 
(millions) 
2010 3.3% (7th) 31.89 1.76 
2011  28.98 2.00 
2012  35.87 1.96 
2013 4.4% (5th) 41.12 2.50 
2014  54.69 3.65 
2015   4.44 
a http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2014-07-25/10509516789.shtml. 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery. 
htm?cn=C01&zb=A0G0T&sj=2013. 
potential candidates. In some cases, com-
petitions are advertised in which start-up 
founders have to pitch their idea to a jury 
of fund managers. The winners no longer 
receive direct subsidies as they once did, 
instead they are given risk capital, access to 
work materials and support in establishing 
their companies. This is intended to sustain-
ably increase success rates and create a 
capital market in which more private in-
vestors can participate in the future. 
Start-up founders can become billion-
aires in this emerging industry. Take Wang 
Tao, for example. His company DJI con-
trolled more than 50 percent of the non-
military US drone market in 2016. Xiaomi, 
a Chinese smartphone manufacturer, is the 
most valuable start-up in the world with a 
market value of 46 billion US dollars. With 
a smartphone designed by Frenchman 
Philippe Starck and launched in China at 
the end of 2016, Xiaomi surpassed Apple 
for the first time as a manufacturer of inno-
vative smartphones. 
The success of many companies is moti-
vating founders and developers. Some of 
them, like Qin Zheng, CEO of ANTVR, a Vir-
tual Reality (VR) tech start-up, see the Inter-
net, artificial intelligence and virtual real-
ity as opportunities to achieve peace and 
understanding between people around 
the world. His enterprise is designing a uni-
versal VR device which, unlike products 
from Google or Apple, is intended to be 
compatible with all phones and computers. 
The headset and adjustable controller can 
be altered and further developed by users 
and developers. The 29-year-old aerospace 
engineer, Qin Zheng, cannot complain 
about a lack of attention. He has already 
met Chinese Vice President, Li Yuanchao, 
the former French Prime Minister Jean-
Pierre Raffarin and a delegation of young 
Polish parliamentarians. Chinese online 
media call it ‘VR diplomacy’. Qin Zheng 
himself claims, “I just want to tell the 
world: the Chinese can also research 
groundbreaking technologies”. 
Digital Challenges for the 
Education Sector 
Despite all the enthusiasm for digital devel-
opment, China is also discussing the accom-
panying risks for the state and society. Ex-
perts have correspondingly taken stance in 
scientific studies, press articles and online 
publications. In the field of pedagogy, they 
see the Internet as a challenge for the per-
sonal development of children and ado-
lescents, particularly with regard to their 
worldview and value system. They repre-
sent the concept of digital civic courage 
which aims to generate a sense of respon-
sibility and commitment to a ‘harmonious 
and orderly development of the digital 
society’. Among the risks of long-term use 
of digital products, the authors listed 
various dependencies, promoting violence 
or gambling addiction, emotional black-
mail and alienation from reality, but also 
health problems. They suggest the trend 
towards digitisation of work and education 
increases the risk of irresponsibility, selfish-
ness and plagiarism; they ultimately fear 
social destabilisation through lies, rumours, 
bullying and hacker attacks. 
This is offset by the opportunities to 
improve teaching offered by digitisation – 
for autonomous and distance learning, as 
well as adult education. One example is 
the website Yiban, a non-profit platform for 
education, daily life and entertainment. 
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Founded in 2007, it shows what a virtual 
university campus might look like. It there-
fore not only supports the internal organi-
sation of training and extracurricular 
activities, but also the content of exchanges 
between universities. 
In 2014, the Chinese government set 
up a series of offices for Internet education 
at universities. It was reacting to concerns 
about cases of bullying, violence and sui-
cides at the country’s universities – events 
blamed on inadequate social integration 
among students. At the same time, the new 
facilities were also supposed to improve 
students’ ideological education. Led by the 
Ministry of Education, or more precisely, 
the local departments of ideological and 
political work, the task of local offices is 
to support the digitisation of higher edu-
cation. There are currently no comparable 
initiatives for the country’s primary and 
secondary schools. 
The Threat of Digitisation 
In Chinese military circles, the Internet 
and digitisation are perceived as major new 
threats. In an article for the political theory 
journal Qiushi, which is published by the 
Central Party School in Beijing, Yuan Yi 
quotes the words of President Xi, “Without 
Internet security, there is no national secu-
rity”. The author is a graduate of the Acad-
emy of Military Sciences of the People’s 
Liberation Army. As he writes, the Internet 
represents a fifth battlefield after land, sea, 
air and space. Despite all the economic pro-
gress, the military threat from the Internet 
could prove to be an Achilles heel for 
national security. He cites several specific 
examples of the subversive effect of cyber 
attacks, such as the successful hacker at-
tacks from Russia on critical infrastructure 
in Estonia, related attacks on the al-Gaddafi 
regime in Libya’s civil war in 2011 and the 
role of online movements during the Arab 
Spring. To counter these attacks, the author 
recommends training specialists to develop 
military technology to defend against and 
weaken enemy attacks as well as developing 
psychological operations to influence pub-
lic opinion in other countries, thereby 
acting as a deterrent. Yuan Yi recommends 
Plan X, a US Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) programme, as a 
model for coordinating research into cyber 
warfare. The programme combines aca-
demic, industrial, commercial and private 
expertise. DARPA was established in 1958 to 
secure the technological superiority of the 
US through targeted support. The agency 
does not conduct any research itself, but 
coordinates, evaluates and finances cor-
responding projects such as ARPANET, the 
precursor to the Internet. 
Other experts, however, emphasise that 
the danger of spreading false and harmful 
information on the Internet could threaten 
the military as a political institution. Critics 
argue that the ideological training of sol-
diers cannot keep pace with the develop-
ment of the Internet as a source of informa-
tion, ideas and entertainment. Rather, it 
might be preferable to improve training 
inthe political and technical aspects of the 
Internet, establishing sources of reliable 
political information on the Internet and 
controlling public opinion on military 
issues. 
Suggestions like these are being dis-
cussed in more detail by lecturers at the 
VBA Academy of Communication Sciences 
in Chongqing. They point out that the tra-
ditional cultural activities of the army have 
become less relevant and corresponding 
reforms are needed. Their focus here is on 
smartphone Internet which may have her-
alded a ‘micro-revolution’. Mobile blogs, 
news services, music and film offers have 
called into question the functionality of the 
conventional cultural work of the military. 
Military communications may only be suc-
cessfully reformed by developing ‘micro-
ideas’ and ‘micro-strategies’. The authors 
use phrases like ‘being in touch with the 
people’ and ‘humanisation’ to describe how 
the media would have to adapt to netizens. 
In their opinion, the anonymity and virtu-
ality of the Internet might even be benefi-
cial for communication within the military 
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because these factors would weaken the in-
fluence of rank. Moreover, both communica-
tion between the generations in the military 
and the exchange of ideas between the army 
and the population could also be improved. 
Communication experts recommend a 
strategy of military culture media that, first-
ly, assigns a more active role to the ‘micro-
world’, secondly, is linked to the needs of 
netizens in terms of games and training 
and, thirdly, aims to coordinate the efforts 
of the media to achieve a ‘united front on 
the Internet’. To achieve this, apps would 
have to be developed that meaningfully 
enhance and complement military training 
whilst, at the same time, remain compat-
ible with core digital culture. 
Golden Opportunities, Bleak Future? 
Numerous opportunities, risks and threats 
associated with China’s digital transforma-
tion are addressed in these very different 
discussions. Given the rapid and often diffi-
cult-to-predict developments, however, it 
is not apparent whose opinion will prevail: 
the optimists who expect a better future 
through technology or the realists who warn 
of incalculable risks. Nevertheless, some 
experts are trying to identify a general 
trend in digitisation. Yun Yanhui, an expert 
at the China Center for Information Indus-
try Development (CCID), stresses that with 
advances in mobile communications and 
Internet technology, there is a growing feel-
ing of being ‘trapped in the digital world’. 
That going ‘too fast’ and ‘too close’ causes 
a loss of personal space. The sheer volume 
of data collected leads to a dependence on 
evaluating algorithms by the companies 
that offer them and by the government 
authorities that control them. Yun Yanhui 
evokes the dystopia of a ‘digital dictator-
ship’ in which people will find themselves 
at the mercy of these powerful institutions. 
At the same time, they may lose their own 
subjectivity because machines would super-
sede human expertise. 
While, according to ‘techno-optimists’, 
there are golden opportunities, this vision 
describes a bleak future in which society 
diverges into polarised groups no longer in 
contact with each other and not recognis-
ing any common organisations. The divi-
sions would be exacerbated since there will 
only be a few creatives who understand the 
technology and a much larger number of 
consumers who would only use the digital 
products. In addition, it must be assumed 
that the situation of marginalised groups 
on the other side of the ‘digital divide’ would 
be magnified still further. This would apply 
to those people without adequate access to 
the Internet and the associated economic 
and social resources. To find ideas for resist-
ing such a development, Yun Yanhui is 
looking back to the early days of the Inter-
net. Values such as equality and self-deter-
mination that were originally associated 
with the Internet were intended to promote 
cooperation for the common benefit of the 
different groups in society. They required 
a stronger sense of community and public 
awareness of the value of personal spaces. 
The first signs that such an awareness is 
emerging appeared in January 2016 when 
the founder of WeChat, Zhang Xiaolong, 
called for a limit on the number of mes-
sages that could be sent so as not to over-
burden users. The Xinhua News Agency 
reported an ‘information explosion’ on 
WeChat. When supervisors and work col-
leagues constantly send messages to each 
other, even on weekends, this will contrib-
ute to many users feeling as though they 
have been ‘taken hostage’ by the platform. 
There are, however, also researchers who 
are more optimistic about the developments. 
Chen Chuan, a lecturer at the Institute of 
Sociology of the Central Party School in 
Beijing, acknowledges the risks of parallel 
societies forming on the Internet with dif-
fering opinions, but he also believes the 
Internet has the potential to reduce social 
conflicts. In particular, the Internet might 
defuse tensions in communication between 
the government and the people. Here, the 
author is referring to the government’s cur-
rent feedback system which is often a cause 
of conflict and dissatisfaction. Formal peti-
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tions are slow and ineffective; informal pro-
test or tacit agreements with local adminis-
trations are unsafe, opaque and unfair. Chen 
Chuan believes that governments could bet-
ter represent even more people at district, 
provincial and national level with a recog-
nised, legitimate mechanism for decision 
making, in which the general population 
would also participate, thereby significantly 
increasing the legitimacy of the Party 
among the population. However, a move 
from tyranny to governing by consensus 
would require considerably more fairness, 
justice and transparency. 
China as a Laboratory for the 
Digital Future 
In many areas, China is like a laboratory 
for the digital future. The speed of the 
country’s digital transformation, coupled 
with the simultaneous use of new digital 
technologies by many hundreds of millions 
of people, allows us insights into digitisa-
tion that cannot be obtained elsewhere. 
Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the 
topic of digital transformation has finally 
been given top priority. It is no longer just 
a matter of closing off and controlling the 
Internet with the help of the ‘Great Fire-
wall’ – the unofficial name of the Chinese 
Internet censorship programme – it is now 
a question of promoting creativity within 
the Chinese Internet. The government sees 
digitisation as a chance to be at the fore-
front of progress that promises prosperity 
and global power status. This is highlighted 
by the comprehensive National Digitisation 
Strategy, the Internet Plus initiative, new 
legislation on Internet security and the am-
bitious long-term goal of setting techno-
logical standards in Internet infrastructure, 
Internet business and Internet security. 
At the same time, the government has 
also addressed the security policy risks, 
technological dependencies and military 
weaknesses resulting from digitisation. 
These concerns reflect warnings by Chinese 
military experts who are even more explicit 
about the consequences of uncontrolled 
discussions and dissemination of soft power 
on the Internet. In their view, technological 
independence should be accompanied by 
cultural influence and sovereign control 
over public opinion in order to prevent for-
eign infiltration as well as criminal and 
terrorist activities. 
In terms of economic policy, digitisation 
is considered a ‘new industrial revolution’ 
which should increase efficiency and out-
put both in business and in administration. 
The government is creating incentives for 
innovative start-ups, promoting the devel-
opment of new technologies and, in doing 
so, can rely on support from the private 
sector. Pioneering companies such as Ali-
baba, a major e-commerce company in 
China, Tencent or Xiaomi play a prominent 
role by creating new industries and jobs 
and inspiring emulators. The Internet 
economy is becoming a potential source 
of sustainable growth and a social power 
factor. The population is benefitting from 
new products and services; many people 
hope that the technological progress will 
lead to a better future with less poverty, 
injustice and conflict. 
Other experts see the risks of social 
polarisation and alienation on the Internet. 
Children, adolescents and students run the 
risk of uncoupling themselves from the rest 
of society, submerging themselves in vir-
tual fantasy worlds and becoming victims 
of addiction, crime or exclusion. In addi-
tion, businesses and even the government 
could be tempted to delegate decisions to 
Big Data algorithms which, in the long term, 
might incapacitate human institutions. 
The topics and issues dominating inter-
nal Chinese discourse on the digital future 
also deal, to a large extent, with states and 
societies beyond the ‘Great Firewall’. There 
are, therefore, a number of possible areas 
for exchanging ideas between Germany 
and/or the EU with China on the social, eco-
nomic and political challenges of digitisa-
tion. One example is the ‘Internet of Things’, 
on which the EU and China adopted a joint 
White Paper in 2016. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to integrate the cross-cutting issue 
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of digitisation into existing dialogue mecha-
nisms between Germany and/or the EU and 
China in order to develop common stand-
ards in a variety of fields for the digital fu-
ture. In the long term, the security of data 
and (critical) infrastructure requires global 
solutions. This is the only way to ensure 
economic and political cooperation in the 
digital age. 
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